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Expanding the Rights of Recording 
Artists 
AN ARGUMENT TO REPEAL SECTION 2855(b) OF 
THE CALIFORNIA LABOR CODE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
You’re a nineteen-year-old dropout without a nickel to your name.  
No car, no job, no credit.  Your gigs at CBGB don’t even cover the 
rent for your studio in Alphabet City.  Who in their right mind would 
hand you $750,000?  Welcome to the record business, where giant 
corporations risk more than $1 billion each year on young, untested 
musicians whose careers typically crash and burn.1 
Any recording artist who hopes to have his music played 
on radios across the world has little choice but to sign with a 
major label.2  Four companies, Universal, Sony BMG, EMI, and 
Warner Music, have acquired vertical and horizontal control 
over almost every aspect of the industry.3  These record 
  
 1 Adaptation based on Chuck Philips, Record Label Chorus: High Risk, Low 
Margin; Music: With Stars Questioning their Deals, the Big Companies Make their Case 
with Numbers, L.A. TIMES, May 31, 2001, at A1, available at 2001 WLNR 10516413 
[hereinafter Philips, Record Label Chorus]. 
 2 The fact that “most recording [artists] who have the opportunity to exit the 
major label system typically re-sign with [another] major label” indicates the necessity 
of signing with one of the Big Four.  Id.  (quoting Hilary Rosen, President of the 
Recording Industry Association of America).  
 3 These record companies control over seventy-five percent of the worldwide 
music sales.  Jack Bishop, Building International Empires of Sound: Concentrations of 
Power and Property in the “Global” Music Market, 28 POPULAR MUSIC & SOC’Y 443, 443 
(2005) (discussing “how the world’s media giants use their power and property to 
influence national and international laws in order to lock down culture and control 
creativity”).   
  Throughout the late 1970s and until the late 1990s, six major record 
companies, Warner, EMI, RCA/BMG, Polygram, MCA/Universal, and Sony, reaped 
virtually all the profits of the music industry, owned the major labels, and held the 
most profitable artists.  Theresa M. Bevilacqua, Note, Time to Say Good-Bye to 
Madonna’s American Pie: Why Mechanical Compulsory Licensing Should be Put to 
Rest, 19 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 285, 301 n.114 (2001) (suggesting the possibility 
that “monopolistic practices [will] plague the music industry in the near future due to 
large corporate mergers”).  After the purchase of Polygram by Universal and the 
merger of Sony and BMG, the major six became four.  See David Lieberman, Lack is 
Determined to be More than a Music Man, USA TODAY, June 13, 2005, at 1B, available 
at 2005 WLNR 9342352. 
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companies, the “Big Four,” control manufacturing, distribution, 
retailing, shelf space, record clubs, and digital delivery, not 
only in the United States, but also in all markets worldwide.4  
The Big Four specialize in marketing and promoting records to 
mass audiences, and they have the capital to take huge 
financial risks to advance an artist.5  Furthermore, only a few 
media companies control most of the nation’s radio stations,6 
making it that much more difficult for an artist to get her 
music on the air without the backing of one of the major labels.7   
Recording artists describe the standard Big Four 
agreements as “unconscionable,” “indentured servitudes,” and 
“impossible”8 because of the control these contracts give the 
record company over the artists’ careers.9  Recording 
  
  Even though the discussions of an EMI/Warner Music merger have been 
put to a halt since the the European Court of First Instance in Luxembourg overturned 
regulatory approval of the 2004 merger of the music units of Sony and Bertelsmann, 
the possibility remains that the four could soon become three.  See Andrew Ross Sorkin 
and Jennny Anderson, Descision on Bids for BMG Music Unit Could Be Imminent, NY 
TIMES, Sept. 5, 2006, at C1, available at LEXIS News Library, USPAPR file; Dan 
Milmo, Analysts Play Matchmaker to EMI and Warner: The Week Ahead, GUARDIAN 
(UK), Nov. 14, 2005, at 29, available at LEXIS News Library, UKPAPR file. 
 4 See Bishop, supra note 3 (“Today’s music business is in the hands of mega-
corporations, which also control TV, radio, publishing, electronics manufacturing, and 
global communications networks.”). 
 5 See Philips, Record Label Chorus, supra note 1. 
 6 Kathleen Sharp, Recording Artists Sue, Aiming to Rock Industry Action 
Expected to Put Big Labels Under Scrutiny, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 7, 2001, at A6, 
available at 2001 WLNR 5521579.  After the passage of the Telecommunications Act of 
1996, the limitations controlling national ownership of radio stations were eliminated.  
Consequently, radio companies could control much larger segments of the airwaves.  
See Zeb G. Schorr, Note, The Future of Online Music: Balancing the Interests of Labels, 
Artists, and the Public, 3 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 67, 85 (2003). 
 7 Sharp, supra note 6. 
 8 See Omar Anorga, Note, Music Contracts Have Musicians Playing in the 
Key of Unconscionability, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 739, 739, 754-73 (2003); Connie Chang, 
Note, Can’t Record Labels and Recording Artists All Just Get Along?: The Debate Over 
California Labor Code § 2855 and it’s Impact on the Music Industry, 12 DEPAUL-LCA 
J. ART & ENT. L. & POL’Y 13, 13 (2002); Sharp, supra note 6. 
 9 Chuck Philips, Courtney Love Seeks to Rock Record Labels’ Contract Policy; 
Music: Suit Challenges Universal’s Royalty Practices; Firm Says it is Fair, L.A. TIMES, 
Feb. 28, 2001, at A1, available at 2001 WLNR 10498258 [hereinafter Philips, Courtney 
Love]. One prominent artist, Courtney Love, asserts that  
the primary reason the [Big Four] record conglomerates have been able to 
call the shots for so long is that they control nearly 90% of the music sold 
throughout the world.  They operate the label system under which most 
music is recorded, manufactured, marketed, promoted and distributed to 
radio, MTV and retail outlets.   
Id.  
  Various other recording artists, such as Don Henley, Patti Austin, and 
LeAnn Rimes, argue that record contracts are unfair.  See Bill Holland, Performers 
Give Testimony Before Judges and Lawmakers—Record Labels, Artists at Loggerheads 
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agreements contain various clauses and provisions that are 
usually non-negotiable.10  One of the foremost reasons for 
dissension between recording artists and record companies is 
the duration of a standard recording contract.11  In most 
instances, a musician signing a contract for the first time is 
expected to deliver five to seven albums.12  Under the standard 
recording agreement, artists must deliver an album every nine 
to eighteen months.13  While in theory an artist could deliver 
seven albums in seven years (if an album is actually delivered 
every nine to twelve months), standard recording industry 
practices preclude this possibility.14  “[R]ecord companies have 
preferred and often insisted on a minimum two-year gap 
between releases for . . . artists.”15 This typical two-year time 
span between album releases substantially increases the 
length of the term of the agreement.  
  
Over Contracts, BILLBOARD, Sept. 22, 2001, available at 2001 WLNR 8736669 
[hereinafter Holland, Performers Give Testimony]; Melinda Newman, Battle Lines 
Drawn Over Seven-Year Statute, BILLBOARD, Sept. 15, 2001, available at 2001 WLNR 
8717304; Chuck Philips, Recording Stars Challenge Music Labels’ Business Practices, 
L.A. TIMES, March 29, 2001, at A1, available at 2001 WLNR 10504302 [hereinafter 
Philips, Recording Stars Challenge] (“Singer-songwriter Don Henley, co-founder of the 
Recording Artists coalition, which represents dozens of stars, including Eric Clapton, 
Joni Mitchell, Q-Tip and Peggy Lee, said: ‘Record companies have been screwing artists 
for ages.  It’s time we organize and fight back.’”). 
 10 Such provisions include: the recoupment clause, the work-for-hire clause, 
the controlled composition clause, discounted royalties for foreign and record-club 
sales, “phony” free goods clauses, cross-collateralization clauses, packaging royalty 
deductions, “breakage” royalty deductions, and new technology royalty deductions.  See 
Holland, Performers Give Testimony, supra note 9.  For further discussion on these 
provisions, see infra Part III.A. 
 11 See Note, California Labor Code Section 2855 and Recording Artists’ 
Contracts, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2632, 2633-34 (2003) (“Section 2855 has been an 
important aspect of almost every significant dispute between a recording artist and a 
major record company during the last decade.”). 
 12 DONALD PASSMAN, ALL YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE MUSIC BUSINESS 
100 (5th ed. 2003) [hereinafter PASSMAN, 5th ed.] (Labels “insist on the right to get a 
total of five to seven albums over the course of the deal.”). 
 13 See Cross Complaint at 6, Love v. Geffen Records, Inc., No. BC 223364 
(Cal. Super. Ct. filed Feb. 7, 2001) [hereinafter Love Cross Complaint] (“For example, 
the [Hole contract] provided for a standard delivery schedule, i.e., for a master 
recording no later than every approximately 18 months.”). 
 14 Chang, supra note 8, at 16-17.   
 15 Love Cross Complaint, supra note 13, at 6. 
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California Labor Code section 285516 is the most 
significant law impacting the duration of a recording 
agreement,17 and it has often been the focus of tension between 
artists and record labels.18  Under section 2855, “professional 
service providers, including actors and sports figures, are not 
required to remain under contract for their services for more 
  
 16 The statute states, in relevant part:  
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subdivision (b), a contract to render 
personal service . . . may not be enforced against the employee beyond seven 
years from the commencement of service under it.  Any contract, otherwise 
valid, to perform or render service of a special, unique, unusual, 
extraordinary, or intellectual character, which gives it peculiar value and the 
loss of which can not be reasonably or adequately compensated in damages in 
an action at law, may nevertheless be enforced against the person contracting 
to render the service, for a term not to exceed seven years from the 
commencement of service under it.  If the employee voluntarily continues to 
serve under it beyond that time, the contract may be referred to as affording 
a presumptive measure of the compensation. 
(b) Notwithstanding subdivision (a): 
(1) Any employee who is a party to a contract to render personal 
service in the production of phonorecords . . . may not invoke the 
provisions of subdivision (a) without first giving written notice to 
the employer . . . specifying that the employee from and after a 
future date certain specified in the notice will no longer render 
service under the contract by reason of subdivision(a).  
(2) Any party to such a contract shall have the right to recover 
damages for a breach of the contract occurring during its term in an 
action commenced during or after its term, but within the 
applicable period prescribed by law.  
(3) In the event a party to such a contract is, or could 
contractually be, required to render personal service in the 
production of a specified quantity of the phonorecords and fails to 
render all of the required service prior to the date specified in the 
notice provided in paragraph (1), the party damaged by the failure 
shall have the right to recover damages for each phonorecord as to 
which that party has failed to render service in an action which, 
notwithstanding paragraph (2), shall be commenced within 45 days 
after the date specified in the notice. 
CAL. LAB. CODE § 2855 (West 2005). 
 17 “Section 2855(b) of the California Labor code provides an exception for 
recording contracts which serves to virtually remove any limits on their length.”  Sen. 
Kevin Murray, Recording Industry Practices, available at http://democrats.sen.ca.gov/ 
articlefiles/985-Recording%20Industry%20Practices.pdf [hereinafter Recording 
Industry Practices] (last visited Sept. 22, 2006). 
 18 Nicholas Baumgartner, The Balance Between Recording Artists and Record 
Companies: A Tip in Favor of the Artists?, 5 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 73, 77 (2003) 
(“The decades-old controversy surrounding [the Seven Year Statute], is at the heart of 
the current tension between recording artists and recording companies.”).  See also 
MELVIN SIMENSKY ET AL., ENTERTAINMENT LAW 257-58 (3rd ed. 2003) (“Several major 
recording acts, including Metallica, Don Henley, Luther Vandross and the Smashing 
Pumpkins, have claimed violation of the seven-year rule in complaints filed against 
their record companies in an effort to get out of their recording agreements.”).  
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than seven years.”19  This limitation, however, is not applicable 
to musicians.  Under subsection (b), an artist can notify his 
label that he wants to be released from his contract after seven 
years, but the label can then sue to recover damages for any 
undelivered albums remaining in the contract, a right that is 
not available to any other professional services employer.20  
Even though section 2855 currently exists only under 
California law, its effects are present in other jurisdictions.21  
Since most recording contracts are signed in or otherwise made 
subject to the laws of New York or California,22 the Big Four, 
with offices operating on both sides of the country, have 
continued to use a standard form agreement, which includes a 
duration provision that is the same in both New York and 
California.23  The labels take advantage of the fact that section 
2855(b) permits them to sue for damages for undelivered 
albums, therefore extending the duration of the agreement for 
as long as possible by requiring an unrealistic number of 
albums.24   
In reality, a recording artist is rarely able to deliver all 
the required number of albums under a recording contract in 
seven years.25  He is therefore never able to fulfill the terms of 
the agreement to leave the record label.26  If the artist tries to 
leave the label after seven years, like any other personal 
  
 19 See A. Barry Cappello, Old Financial Ways are Over for Record Biz, 21-
SPG ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 23 (2003). 
 20 See CAL. LAB. CODE § 2855(b)(3). 
 21 In Radioactive, J.V. v. Manson, 153 F. Supp. 2d 462 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), the 
agreement between recording artist Shirley Manson and her record label, Radioactive, 
was subject to New York jurisdiction, and the contract still obligated Manson to deliver 
at least one album, and at the sole option of Radioactive, up to six additional albums. 
 22 M. WILLIAM KRASILOVSKY & SIDNEY SHEMEL, THIS BUSINESS OF MUSIC: 
THE DEFINITIVE GUIDE TO THE MUSIC INDUSTRY 14 (8th ed. 2000) (“Most recording 
contracts are signed in or otherwise made subject to the laws of New York State or 
California.”). 
 23 Id.  The only difference that exists between a recording agreement entered 
into in New York and one in California is a clause under section 3423 of the California 
Labor Code, which requires record companies to pay a guaranteed minimum amount 
per year before they can obtain an injunction against an artist attempting to leave the 
label while still under exclusive contract.  This statute relates to obtaining a court 
order barring the artist from recording for another company, but does not affect the 
continuing right to sue for monetary damages.  This recognizes the fact that it would be 
unfair for a label to require an artist to remain under contract if the artist is not 
receiving any income.  See id. at 15. 
 24 A. Barry Cappello & Troy A. Thielemann, Challenging the Practices of the 
Recording Industry: Recent Lawsuits by Recording Artists Question the Legality of their 
Contracts, L.A. LAW., MAY 25, 2002, at 14, 16 (2002). 
 25 Id. at 16. 
 26 Id. 
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services employee, the label will sue for damages.  Recording 
artists allege this is a form of “involuntary servitude” because 
they are left with no choice but to work or be subject to legal 
sanction.27   
Whereas section 2855(b) has continued to place artists 
in a disadvantaged position for the past nineteen years, the 
music industry has changed considerably.28  Music companies 
first fought with, but are now slowly accepting, a revolution in 
the way music is delivered via digital distribution.29  Today, 
record companies are reinventing themselves as full-service 
music companies, claiming exclusivity over new media such as 
ringtones and voicetones as well as over traditional media such 
as film and TV.30  It used to be that the label only acquired the 
exclusive right to record an artist during the term of the 
agreement.31  New clauses added to today’s recording contracts 
provide the label with a portion of the artist’s revenues in all 
ancillary activities.32  These provisions, however, deprive the 
artists of a substantial amount of income that they never 
before shared with the label.33 
The changed music industry makes the application of 
section 2855(b) more unjust than ever before.  Even though the 
statute lacks a definition of “damages,”34 record companies 
believe they should be able to recover lost profits based on the 
“expected profits on the additional albums that artists have 
neither delivered nor created.”35  Under the new form of 
recording agreements, the record company will likely argue 
that it should be able to collect not only expected profits on 
album sales, but also expected profits derived from all the new 
areas over which they have exclusive rights.  This creates the 
prospect of enormous damages, and essentially leaves the artist 
with no choice but to work even if doing so will require the 
artist to perform beyond seven years. 
  
 27 Id. (quoting United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 942-43 (1988)). 
 28 See infra Part IV. 
 29 See id. 
 30 Owen J. Sloane, Commentary: The Changing Deal, BILLBOARD, Aug. 20, 
2005, available at LEXIS News Library, USPAPR file. 
 31 KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 22, at 16. 
 32 Record labels are “exploit[ing] and expand[ing] their traditional areas of 
exclusivity to include such media as ringtones, voicetones, mobile wallpaper, 
videogames, film and TV, and other formats that carry music.”  Sloane, supra note 30. 
 33 Charles Duhigg, EMI Is Expected to Unveil New Profit-Sharing Deal With 
Korn, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 14317222. 
 34 Cappello & Thielemann, supra note 24, at 17. 
 35 Id. 
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This Note argues that section 2855(b) should be 
repealed because it permits unconscionable contracts that 
impose involuntary servitude.  Part II provides some 
background to section 2855, including the history and purpose 
of the statute, and the addition of subsection (b).  Part III 
describes the structure of recording agreements and the 
application of section 2855(b) to the music industry in 1987, 
when the amendment was adopted.  Part IV examines the 
relationship between the evolving music industry and changes 
in recording agreements.  Specifically, it will compare the state 
of the music industry and the structure of agreements that 
developed from the time the amendment was passed in 1987, to 
2000 when digital distribution was introduced.  This section 
will end with a look at 2005 as record labels expand their areas 
of exclusivity.  Part V will argue for the repeal of the 
amendment.  In doing so, this section will demonstrate the 
effects of section 2855(b) on the music industry today and 
analyze the legal doctrines of unconscionability and 
involuntary servitude in connection with today’s recording 
agreements.  Throughout the discussion, these sections will 
examine the record labels’ justifications for keeping the 
amendment, and demonstrate how they are now even less valid 
than when it was passed.  
II. BACKGROUND OF SECTION 2855 
A. History and Purpose 
The United States’ constitutional prohibition against 
involuntary servitude36 laid the foundation for the California 
legislature to enact section 2855.  In 1872, California 
lawmakers passed legislation to protect against involuntary 
servitude in the form of unconscionable employment 
agreements.37  The United States Supreme Court has held 
involuntary servitude to mean a “condition of servitude in 
which the victim is forced to work for the defendant by use or 
threat . . . of coercion through law or legal process.”38  
Accordingly, an employer cannot force an employee to work for 
  
 36 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. 
 37 Revella Cook, The Impact of Digital Distribution on the Duration of 
Recording Contracts, 6 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 40, 42 (2003) (discussing Senator 
Kevin Murray’s testimony before the California State Senate in which he explains the 
legislative purpose behind the Seven Year Statute).  
 38 United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 952 (1988). 
728 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:2 
him when the work involves services of a personal nature, so 
courts refuse to order specific performance of contracts for 
personal services.39  
The California legislature was concerned with the rights 
of large classes of workers whose personal services constituted 
their means of livelihood.40  These employees were 
contractually prohibited from changing employers or 
occupations,41 which was a violation of the principles of 
unconscionability.  The doctrine of unconscionability protects a 
contracting party from harsh and oppressive terms.42  
Unconscionability presents itself in two forms: procedural 
unconscionability, which relates to procedural deficiencies in 
the contract formation process,43 and substantive 
unconscionability, which relates to the contract terms 
themselves and whether those terms are unreasonably 
favorable to the more powerful party.44   
Unconscionable working relationships were common 
before the first Civil Code was established in California in 
1872.45  Inhabitants of California who did not share the same 
freedoms as others, legally or socially, lacked true freedom of 
contract and were often forced to work pursuant to harsh and 
oppressive terms since there was “little or no enforcement 
  
 39 Theresa E. Van Beveren, The Demise of the Long-Term Personal Services 
Contract in the Music Industry: Artistic Freedom Against Company Profit, 3 UCLA 
ENT. L. REV. 377, 385-86 n.26 (1996) (“Many contracts between musicians (or athletes) 
and recording or management companies contain a negative covenant ensuring the 
entertainer’s exclusivity.  At least one court has held that if such a contract is for a 
specific period of time, then it should be classified as a contract for personal services.  
If, however, the contract has no time limitation, then it should be considered in light of 
case law dealing with employment contracts.” (referring to the majority opinion in 
Ichiban Records, Inc. v. Rap-A-Lot Records, Inc., No. 01-95-00085-CV, 1995 Tex. App. 
LEXIS 1739, at 15 (1st Dist., Aug. 1, 1995))). 
 40 De Haviland v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 153 P.2d 983, 988 (Cal. 1944) 
(discussing the legislative intent in passing section 2855). 
 41 Id. 
 42 See Anorga, supra note 8, at 772 (“The doctrine of unconscionability is an 
extraordinary remedy that should only be used to protect a contracting party from 
harsh and oppressive terms.”).  See also 8 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A 
TREATISE ON THE LAW ON CONTRACTS § 18:8 (4th ed. 1993 & Supp. 2005) (“The 
principle [of the doctrine of unconscionability] is one of the prevention of oppression 
and unfair surprise and not of disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior 
bargaining power.” (quoting U.C.C. § 2-302, comment 1 (2003))). 
 43 8 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 42, § 18:10. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Donna R. Mooney, The Search for a Legal Presumption of Employment 
Duration or Custom of Arbitrary Dismissal in California 1848-1872, 21 BERKELEY J. 
EMP. & LAB. L. 633, 634. 648-51 (2000) (discussing the social and economic 
environment in California prior to the introduction of the Civil Code in 1872).     
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against slavery.”46  This oppressive environment left personal 
services employees in a situation where they were waiving 
their rights to limit the life of personal services agreements.47  
The lawmakers recognized a right of private contract and they 
believed that a restriction of such right in this situation better 
preserved “public comfort, health, safety, morals and welfare.”  
They therefore created section 1980 of the Civil Code, which 
later became section 2855 of the California Labor Code.48 
B. Section 2855(a) 
California Labor Code section 2855, which is commonly 
referred to as the Seven Year Statute,49 prohibits the 
enforcement of personal services contracts beyond seven years, 
and allows employees in California to terminate contracts after 
that period.50  In 1947, De Haviland v. Warner Brothers 
Pictures, Inc.51 established the prevailing interpretation of the 
  
 46 Id. at 652. 
 47 De Haviland v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 153 P.2d 983, 989 (Cal. 1944). 
 48  See id. at 985-88.  As enacted in 1872, section 1980 of the Civil Code read 
as follows:  
A contract to render personal service, other than a contract of apprenticeship, 
as provided in the chapter on master and servant, cannot be enforced against 
the employee beyond the term of two years from the commencement of 
service under it; but if the employee voluntarily continues his service under it 
beyond that time, the contract may be referred to as affording a presumptive 
measure of the compensation. 
In 1931, section 1980 was amended to read as follows: 
A contract to render personal service, other than a contract of apprenticeship, 
as provided in the chapter on master and servant, and other than a contract 
entered into pursuant to the proviso hereinafter in this section contained 
cannot be enforced against the employee beyond the term of seven years from 
the commencement of service under it;  
Exceptional services. Provided, however, that any contract, otherwise valid, 
to perform or render service of a special, unique, unusual, extraordinary or 
intellectual character, which gives it peculiar value, the loss of which cannot 
be reasonably or adequately compensated in damages in an action at law, 
may nevertheless be enforced against the person contracting to render such 
service, for a term not beyond a period of seven years from the 
commencement of service under it. 
In 1937, the section was repealed and section 2855 of the Labor Code was enacted.   
 49 See, e.g., Chris Marlowe, Artists, RIAA Plead Cases at “7 Year Statute” 
Hearing, HOLLYWOOD REP., Sept. 6, 2001, available at LEXIS News Library, USPAPR 
file; Philips, Courtney Love, supra note 9. 
 50 See CAL. LAB. CODE § 2855(a) (West 2005); California Labor Code Section 
2855 and Recording Artists’ Contracts, supra note 11, at 2642.  
 51 153 P.2d 983 (Cal. 1944). 
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Seven Year Statute for all personal services contracts.52  
Warner Brothers (“Warner Bros.”) signed a contract with 
Hollywood actress Olivia de Haviland for a one-year term that 
gave Warner Bros., through various option clauses, the right to 
extend the contract for up to six successive one-year terms.53  
The contract also gave Warner Bros. the right to suspend de 
Haviland for “any period or periods when she should fail, 
refuse or neglect to perform her services to the full limit of her 
ability and as instructed by [Warner Bros.].”54  In connection 
with this, Warner Bros. had the right to extend the term for a 
time equal to the suspension period(s).55 
Warner Bros. suspended de Haviland for a total of 
twenty-five weeks over the course of seven years.56  
Consequently, Warner Bros. sought to exercise its option and 
extend the term of the contract for a time equal to the twenty-
five week suspension period, which would have caused the 
term of the agreement to last more than seven calendar years.57   
Warner Bros. contended that the personal services contract 
could be enforced for seven years of actual service.58  The court 
rejected this argument and held that section 2855 should be 
interpreted as limiting personal services contracts to seven 
calendar years.59 
In keeping with the purpose of the Seven Year Statute, 
the court reasoned that public policy encouraged limiting the 
term to seven calendar years to promote economic mobility.60  
  
 52 California Labor Code Section 2855 and Recording Artists’ Contracts, 
supra note 11, at 2634-35. 
 53 De Haviland, 153 P.2d at 984. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id.  
 58 Id. at 985 (“[A] contract for ‘exceptional services’ could be enforced against 
an employee for seven years of actual service, even though the employee would thereby 
be required to render services over a period of more than seven calendar years.”). 
 59 De Haviland, 153 P.2d at 986 (“We cannot believe that the phrase ‘for a 
term not beyond a period of seven years’ carries a hidden meaning.  It cannot be 
questioned that the limitation of time . . . was one to be measured in calendar years. It 
is conceded that contracts for general services are limited to seven calendar years. The 
substitution of years of service for calendar years would work a drastic change of state 
policy with relation to contracts for personal services.”). 
 60 Chang, supra note 8, at 18 (“The court further reasoned that public policy 
limited the term . . . because the ability to change employment after that allotted time, 
whether to afford a reasonable opportunity to move upward along with increased 
skillfulness, or exploit new economic conditions, was highly advantageous to the 
employee.”).  See also De Haviland, 153 P.2d at 988 (“As one grows more experienced 
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As the employee becomes more skillful, he should be able to 
seek new employment after the allotted time in order to obtain 
the highest compensation.61  The court’s interpretation of 
section 2855 created a new “free agency” era for actors.62  The 
powerful studios had previously stifled the careers of many 
actors by holding them to long-term contracts.63  As a result of 
the De Haviland decision, actors gained the power to negotiate 
new contracts with different studios and on better terms based 
on their true market value.64 
Section 2855’s application in the music industry was 
markedly different.65  Record labels attempted to avoid the law 
altogether by rewriting contracts of disgruntled stars; the 
labels offered large cash advances and higher royalty rates in 
exchange for more albums.66  Some labels were actually able to 
contravene the statute by telling artists that each renegotiation 
of a contract constituted a new contract with the “seven-year 
clock ticking anew.”67  It was only a matter of time before the 
record companies would petition for legislative action, ensuring 
their ability to hold a recording artist to an exclusive contract 
long after the allotted seven years.  In 1987, the Recording 
Industry Association of America (“RIAA”)—the influential 
trade association representing the music industry68—
successfully lobbied for a proposal that became section 
2855(b).69  
  
and skillful there should be a reasonable opportunity to move upward and to employ 
his abilities to the best advantage and for the highest obtainable compensation.”). 
 61 De Haviland, 153 P.2d at 988 (“There are innumerable reasons why a 
change of employment may be to [the employees’] advantage.”). 
 62 See Holland, Performers Give Testimony, supra note 9 (“Many 
entertainment attorneys say the hearing [to repeal section 2855(b)] was reminiscent of 
challenges that eventually brought down the old Hollywood studio system, which 
hampered or ruined many actors’ careers by holding them to long-term contracts.”). 
 63 Id. 
 64 See California Labor Code Section 2855 and Recording Artists’ Contracts, 
supra note 11, at 2635. 
 65 Chang, supra note 8, at 18-19. (“The application of § 2855 in the music 
industry . . . has seen different results. . . . Around 1985, the Recording Industry 
Association of America (RIAA), the industry’s lobbying arm, launched an attack on § 
2855 on behalf of record labels and tried to get the statute extended to ten years.”). 
 66 Id. at 18. 
 67 Id. at 18-19. 
 68 California Labor Code Section 2855 and Recording Artists’ Contracts, 
supra note 11, at 2632. 
 69 Id. at 2636 (“In 1987, after several revisions, the RIAA’s proposal became 
section 2855(b).”). 
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C. Exception to the Seven Year Statute: Section 2855(b) 
Subsection (b) of the Seven Year Statute requires 
recording artists, unlike any other contractual employee 
rendering creative, intellectual, or professional services, to 
serve written notice of their intent to terminate a contract after 
seven years.70  Most importantly, subsection (b) subjects a 
recording artist, unlike any other artist under contract, to 
lawsuits for damages alleged to flow from the artist’s failure to 
deliver the required number of albums during the term of the 
contract.71  Essentially, the RIAA was able to exclude recording 
artists from the protections offered by the Code.72 
In its proposal to the California legislature, the RIAA 
argued that the application of section 2855 to the music 
industry was unfair for various reasons.  First, the law allowed 
an artist to breach a recording contract after seven years, 
regardless of the artist’s remaining obligations.73  Second, 
record companies made large investments in an artist based 
primarily on the guarantee that the artist would deliver the 
specified number of albums required under the contract.74  
Third, the RIAA argued that the primary reason most artists 
were not able to record and deliver the required number of 
albums in seven years was because the artists themselves were 
negligent.75  
While artists and attorneys later challenged the validity 
of these arguments,76 subsection (b) created an exemption for 
  
 70 See Hearings Before the Senate Select Comm. on the Entm’t Indus., 2001 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2001) [hereinafter Hearings: 2001] (testimony of Ann Chaitovitz, 
Director of Sound Recordings, AFTRA). 
 71 See id.  
 72 See id. (“The result of this exemption was to effectively lock out recording 
artists from the protections offered by the code, rendering the code moot on any 
practical level for only one group of individuals—the music makers.” (testimony of 
Michael Greene, President & CEO, Grammys)). 
 73 See Chuck Philips, Company Town; Lawmakers Take Aim at Music 
Industry Contracts; Recording: Officials Prepare to Examine What Artists Call the 
“Unconscionable” Agreements of the Big Five Conglomerates, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2001, 
at 1, available at LEXIS News Library, USPAPR file [hereinafter Philips, Lawmakers 
Take Aim].   
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
 76 In 2001, Senator Kevin Murray (D-Cal.) proposed California Senate Bill 
1246 (“S.B. 1246”) to repeal section 2855(b).  See Cook, supra note 37, at 42.  S.B. 1246 
proposed the elimination of the exception for recording artists.  This amended version 
would have left subdivision (a) of the Seven Year Statute in effect, deleted the 
provisions relating to personal services in the production of sound recordings, and 
modified the subdivision addressing damages for breaches of recording contracts to 
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the record companies that violated the public policy rationale 
behind section 2855—to optimize the welfare of employees by 
allowing them freedom to seek better employment 
opportunities after the allotted amount of time.77  By providing 
labels with the ability to sue recording artists for damages 
without regard to the Seven Year Statute, the legislature 
created a regime under which recording artists found little 
protection.78  The unconscionable provisions of recording 
agreements only further exposed the artist.     
III. APPLICATION OF SECTION 2855(b) TO A RECORDING 
CONTRACT 
A. Structure of the Recording Contract 
Congratulations, you got yourself a deal.  Beware, making a living 
from a business you don’t fully understand can be risky.  A large 
number of artists, like yourself, including major ones, have never 
learned such basics as how record royalties are computed, what a 
copyright is, how music publishing works, and a number of other 
concepts that directly affect your life.  But without understanding 
these basics as a foundation, it’s impossible for you to understand 
  
limit the amount that could be recovered.  Legislative Counsel’s Digest, S.B. 1246, 
available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/01-02/bill/sen/sb_1201-1250/sb_1246_bill_ 
20020801_amended_asm.pdf (last visited Sept. 26, 2006).  As originally introduced in 
January 2002, S.B. 1246 simply eliminated the damages provision for breaches of 
recording contracts, but after the process of negotiating with lobbyists from both sides 
took place, the subsequent two parts were added.  See Baumgartner, supra note 18, at 
83.  (“While it seem[ed] . . . that the ideal result for recording artists would be the mere 
elimination of the recording artist exception, it seem[ed] equally likely that the 
recording companies would so irrepressibly lobby against passage of SB 1246 as to 
defeat the Bill entirely.”). 
  During a series of hearings held by the California Select Committee on the 
Entertainment Industry, chaired by Senator Murray, top U.S. recording artists and 
labor leaders converged on the state capitol to call on legislators to support S.B. 1246.  
Newman, supra note 9.  The artists refuted the RIAA’s fourteen year-old arguments, 
and were eager to throw a spotlight on the practices of the music industry.  Sharp, 
supra note 6.  Despite a series of high-profile lawsuits and support from top U.S. 
recording artists and labor leaders, negotiations between the Recording Artists 
Coalition (RAC) and the RIAA failed to produce an agreement.  See Melinda Newman 
& Bill Holland, Artists Seek Govt. Redress of Contract, Radio Issues: Acts Want Repeal 
of 7-Year Statute, BILLBOARD, Feb. 2, 2002 at 1, available at 2002 WLNR 10375838; 
Philips, Lawmakers Take Aim, supra note 73; Recording Industry Practices, supra note 
17.  S.B. 1246 was put on hold and may be revisited in an upcoming legislative session.  
Recording Industry Practices, supra note 17.  While the bill has not been revisited in 
another legislative session as of the writing of this Note, the possibility is still very 
strong because this is an issue that must be solved by the legislature. 
 77 Chang, supra note 8, at 21.  
 78 See California Labor Code Section 2855 and Recording Artists’ Contracts, 
supra note 11, at 2642. 
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the intricacies of your professional life.  And as your success grows, 
and your life gets more complex, you’ll become even more lost.79   
Because of the high failure rate of released albums,80 
record companies absorb great losses on most albums, and thus 
insist that they must earn profits from the few successful acts 
on their rosters.81  The standard industry contract, then, is 
typically structured around a business model that allows labels 
to extract much of their earnings from the handful of 
blockbuster albums each year.82  Some of the devices used by 
the labels include minimum recording requirements with 
additional options, recoupable artist advances, and exclusive 
rights over the artist’s creative output.83  All of the major 
contract clauses described in this section continue to exist in 
agreements today even though the numbers have changed 
slightly.84  More importantly, however, is taking into account 
how the structure of agreements evolve, and how those changes 
affect the application of section 2855(b).85 
Recording agreements set forth a minimum number of 
albums that the artist must deliver to the record company 
during the contract term.86  At the time the amendment was 
passed, companies typically insisted on one firm album 
  
 79 Adaptation based on DONALD PASSMAN, ALL YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT 
THE MUSIC BUSINESS 3 (1st ed. 1991) [hereinafter PASSMAN, 1st ed.].  Throughout this 
section the footnotes sometimes cite the first edition of Donald Passman’s book.  The 
first edition is referred to because it provides a more accurate look at the way recording 
agreements were structured around the time subsection (b) was passed, specifically the 
numerical figures of deal terms (i.e. advance monies, royalty percentages).  The general 
concepts of advances, royalties, and the like remain the same in recording agreements 
today, however, and therefore, the discussion of these provisions are supported by 
citations from both versions of the book as a method of comparison.   
 80 See Hearings: 2001, supra note 70 (testimony of Ann Chaitovitz, Director of 
Sound Recordings, AFTRA).  In Ann Chaitovitz’ testimony, she recounted singer Sheryl 
Crow’s experiences.  Crow did not receive any money until after her record had sold 
three or four million copies, demonstrating that it can take two or three years for an 
artist to become successful and actually receive a royalty payment.  Ann stated that “in 
1999, nearly 39,000 recordings were released, but only 3 singles and 135 albums—
0.35%—were certified as selling three million units [reaching a level of recognizable 
success].”  Id. 
 81 California Labor Code Section 2855 and Recording Artists’ Contracts, 
supra note 11 at 2638. 
 82 Philips, Recording Stars Challenge, supra note 9. 
 83 See infra notes 86-99 and accompanying text. 
 84 See infra Part IV.A & B for a description of the changes that occurred from 
the time the amendment was passed to today.   
 85 Part V of this Note asserts that the application of section 2855(b) in today’s 
record industry leads to even more harsh results. 
 86 KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 22, at 17. 
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obligation with options for seven to nine more.87  For each 
album, the artist receives an advance of monies, from which he 
pays all costs to produce the records and gets to keep any 
remaining portion as pre-royalty compensation.88  When the 
RIAA successfully lobbied for the amendment, a new artist 
typically received an advance of $175,000 to $250,000, whereas 
a mid-level recording artist may have received an advance of 
up to $400,000.89  The advance for a top-selling artist could rise 
to more than $500,000.90  Although these advances may seem 
substantial, they are quickly consumed by the costs necessary 
to release an album, including recording, video production, 
marketing and promotion costs.91 
  
 87 See PASSMAN, 1st ed., supra note 79, at 91.  A label, however, is not 
required to release every album that an artist is committed to deliver.  The agreements 
contain a record company’s commitment to record and distribute only one album (a 
“firm album”) from the artist and option clauses that, if exercised by the company, 
require the artist to record and deliver additional albums (“options” or “option 
albums”).  See KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 22, at 14; PASSMAN, 1st ed., supra 
note 79, at 91; PASSMAN, 5th ed., supra note 12, at 100.  The company therefore 
commits itself to the smallest obligation it can negotiate, while keeping the option to 
demand as much product as possible.  PASSMAN, 1st ed., supra note 79, at 91; PASSMAN, 
5th ed., supra note 12, at 100.  Further adding to the one-sidedness of the agreement, 
after the initial album is released, the record company has the option of “dropping” the 
musician if he has not generated profits, or is no longer marketable.  Philips: 
Lawmakers Take Aim, supra note 73.   
 88 See PASSMAN, 1st ed., supra note 79, at 85-89; PASSMAN, 5th ed., supra 
note 12, at 80; GARY STIFFLEMAN & BONNIE GREENBERG, Exclusive Recording 
Agreements Between An Artist and A Record Company, in 8 ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY 
CONTRACTS ¶ 159.03, at 159-17 to 159-18 (Donald C. Farber ed., 1986); Cook, supra 
note 37, at 41. 
 89 PASSMAN, 1st ed., supra note 79, at 85.  In the first edition of his book, 
Donald Passman distinguishes artists as follows: New Artist: an artist that has never 
signed a record deal, or an artist that has been signed but never sold over 150,000 
albums per release; Midlevel Artist: an artist whose last album sold in the 200,000 to 
500,000 range; Superstar: sales from 750,000 and up.  He acknowledges that these 
categories are rough approximations, as there are many variables.  Id. at 82. 
 90 Id. at 85. 
 91 See Downs et. al, Sound Recordings and Music Videos, in COUNSELING 
CLIENTS IN THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY,  311 PLI/PAT 11, 13-14 (1991) [hereinafter 
Sound Recordings and Music Videos] (Recording costs of up to $250,000, promotion, 
advertising and initial production of up to $300,000, and additional costs of 
distribution).  In addition, the record company charges the artist 50% of video costs, to 
create music videos, and 100% of independent radio promotion costs, to get the songs 
played on the radio.  Cook, supra note 37, at 41.  In addition to a specific list of 
recoupable items (like cash to the artist, recording costs, and video costs), almost every 
contract has a general provision that says all amounts “paid to you or on your behalf, or 
otherwise paid in connection with this agreement” are recoupable unless the contract 
specifically provides otherwise.  PASSMAN, 1st ed., supra note 79, at 76; PASSMAN, 5th 
ed., supra note 12, at 82.   
  In late 2005, payola payments made by record labels to get songs played on 
the radio made headlines again after some label executives were discovered bribing 
programmers to play songs by certain artists.  “An investigation led by New York 
Attorney General Eliot Spitzer into pay-for-play schemes resulted in Sony-BMG 
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These expenses are all charged against the artist’s 
royalties.92  Royalties are the percentage the artist receives on 
records sold.93  A newly signed artist in the late eighties 
typically received a royalty of eleven to thirteen percent.94  
Established artists could usually negotiate a higher royalty 
rate.95  An artist will not see a penny of these royalties, 
however, until the label recoups the entire advance and all 
other chargeable expenditures associated with the release of 
the album.96  Because advances are non-returnable, if an artist 
does not sell enough records to recoup the full amount of the 
advance, the record company loses that amount.97  It is this 
major loss that labels use in defense of their business practices 
that artists so often label as “unfair.”98  A label can, however, 
cross-collateralize the loss against future royalty streams.99  
Therefore, if an artist delivers his first album, but does not 
recover the full advance, the deficit from the first album would 
  
making a $10 million settlement and the Warner Group paying another $5 million.”  
Steve Morse, Amid Industry Troubles Some Sterling Moment, Live 8, Stones and U2 
Shows Stood Out, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 25, 2005, at N7, available at 2005 WLNR 
21064330.  The focus then turns to the question of whether or not the labels will 
continue to charge these independent promotion costs to recording artists even though 
the practice has been labeled as “illegal” and “deceptive.”  Amanda Bronstad, Facing 
the Music: Debatable Point: Tough Stance may not Halt Tradition of Payola, L.A.. BUS. 
J., Dec. 5, 2005, at 14, available at 2005 WLNR 22007369. 
 92 In Courtney Love’s cross complaint, it was argued that “[i]n addition to the 
unworkable theoretical delivery schedule, the Agreement effectively required the artist 
to incur production and other costs, recoupable against advances, which virtually 
guaranteed little financial return for most artists and monumental profits for the 
record company.”  Love Cross Complaint, supra note 13, at 7. 
 93 See KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 22, at 19; PASSMAN, 1st ed., supra 
note 79, at 62-73 (discussing royalty calculations); PASSMAN, 5th ed., supra note 12, at 
68-79 (same). 
 94 PASSMAN, 1st ed., supra note 79, at 83.   
 95 See KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 22, at 19.  A midlevel artist 
typically received a royalty of 14-16%.  A superstar artist could receive anywhere 
between 16-20%.  PASSMAN, 1st ed., supra note 79, at 83. 
 96 PASSMAN, 1st ed., supra note 79, at 74-79; PASSMAN, 5th ed., supra note 12, 
at 80-84. 
 97 PASSMAN, 1st ed., supra note 79, at 77; PASSMAN, 5th ed., supra note 12, at 
82. 
 98 California Labor Code Section 2855 and Recording Artists’ Contracts, 
supra note 11, at 2638 (“Because of the high failure rate of released albums, however, 
record companies absorb great losses and thus insist that they must earn profits from 
the few successful acts on their rosters.”).  See supra note 9 and accompanying text for 
a listing of artists who argue that their contracts are unfair.  
 99 PASSMAN, 1st ed., supra note 79, at 78-79; PASSMAN, 5th ed., supra note 12, 
at 83-84. 
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be recouped from the earnings of the second album in addition 
to the advance for the second album.100       
As an additional incentive to underwrite the enormous 
costs of developing an unknown artist’s career, record 
companies acquire the exclusive right to record an artist during 
the term of the recording agreement.101  Traditionally, this 
simply meant that the artist could not make records for 
anybody else—it did not prohibit the artist from appearing on 
television, in a motion picture, or on the radio as long as the 
artist did not grant the use of his recordings for phonograph 
record purposes.102 
Various other contractual provisions—the work-for-hire 
clause, the controlled composition clause, and numerous 
discounted royalty provisions—continue to be the source of 
rigid disagreement amongst those in the legal and music 
communities.103  While no American court has ever held a 
  
 100 PASSMAN, 1st ed., supra note 79, at 78-79; PASSMAN, 5th ed., supra note 12, 
at 83-84. 
 101 See KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 27, at 16. 
 102 See PASSMAN, 1st ed., supra note 79, at 119-23; PASSMAN, 5th ed., supra 
note 12, at 132-37; Sound Recordings and Music Videos, supra note 91, at 37-39.   
 103 Anorga, supra note 8, at 754.  These provisions include: 
(1) The work-for-hire clause, which allows the labels to become the owners, or 
authors, of the sound recordings that the artist produces under that 
contract—this means the artist loses all rights and control in how the song 
will or will not be exploited by the record label.  See Holland, Performers Give 
Testimony, supra note 9; Future of Music Coalition, Major Label Contract 
Clause Critique 2-3, Oct. 3, 2001, http://www.futureofmusic.org/ 
contractcrit.cfm [hereinafter Contract Clause Critique] (last visited Sept. 22, 
2006);  see also PASSMAN, 1st ed., supra note 79, at 240-42; PASSMAN, 5th ed., 
supra note 12, at 276-79. 
(2) The controlled composition clause, which puts a cap on how much money 
an artist can earn for musical contributions in the form of mechanical 
royalties (monies paid by a record company for the right to use a song in 
records).  See PASSMAN, 1st ed., supra note 79, at 185-91; PASSMAN, 5th ed., 
supra note 12, at 209-19; Anorga, supra note 8, at 765-66 (discussing the 
controlled composition provision); Holland, Performers Give Testimony, supra 
note 9; Contract Clause Critique, supra, at 6-7.   
The Copyright Office sets the statutory rate for mechanical 
royalties, increasing every two years according to changes in cost of 
living as determined by the Consumer Price Index. . . . The first 
rate increase was in 1981.  It was at about this time that the 
Controlled Composition clause became commonplace in record 
contracts.   
See Contract Clause Critique, supra, at 6. 
(3) Discounted foreign and record-club sales provisions, which provide that an 
artist will receive a discounted royalty for the sale of his music in these 
formats.  See PASSMAN, 1st ed., supra note 79, at 132-51 (discussing advanced 
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standardized music contract unconscionable,104 it is hard to 
deny the one-sidedness of these agreements.  The record 
companies stand firm in their position, however, that they take 
huge risks investing extensively in unproven artists, and 
therefore need to capitalize on those artists who achieve 
success.105  Undeniably, labels do spend enormous amounts of 
money with no guarantee that they will see any return on that 
investment.106  Leaving the successful artists bankrupt and in 
debt to their record labels, however, is not a just way to make 
  
royalty computations); PASSMAN, 5th ed., supra note 12, at 151-73 (same); 
Holland, Performers Give Testimony, supra note 9.  Record club sales are a 
substantial source of income for record labels, more than $1 billion in 2001.  
The record clubs actually pay hundreds of millions of dollars in up-front fees 
to record companies in order to have the rights to sell their artists’ CDs, but 
the labels neither disclose nor include these fees when calculating artist 
royalties.  Courtney Love Sues UMG Recordings Charging Violation of 
California Labor Code, PR NEWSWIRE, Feb. 28, 2001, available at LEXIS 
News Library, USPAPR file [hereinafter Courtney Love Sues]. 
(4) “Phony” free goods clauses, which provide that the record company does 
not have to pay the artist a royalty on records that are not “sold.”  As a result, 
if a company gave a retailer fifteen free records for every eighty-five 
purchased, the artist did not receive a royalty.  However, today, few 
companies actually give away fifteen percent of the records they ship, yet still 
don’t pay artist royalties on these records.  See PASSMAN, 1st ed., supra note 
79, at 67-69; PASSMAN, 5th ed., supra note 12, at 72-74; Holland, Performers 
Give Testimony, supra note 9.   
(5) Breakage royalty deductions, which dates back to the days when shellac 
records (which haven’t been manufactured since 1975) arrived broken at the 
retailer, and therefore labels passed on the cost of damage to the artist.  See 
PASSMAN, 1st ed., supra note 79, at 71; PASSMAN, 5th ed., supra note 12, at 
77; Holland, Performers Give Testimony, supra note 9. 
(6) New technology deductions allowed labels to deduct up to twenty-five 
percent from the artist’s royalty for the development of CDs. See PASSMAN, 
1st ed., supra note 79, at 138-40; PASSMAN, 5th ed., supra note 12, at 88-91; 
Holland, Performers Give Testimony, supra note 9. 
 104 Anorga, supra note 8, at 740. 
 105 See Hearings Before the Senate Select Comm. On the Entm’t Indus., 2002 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2002) (statement of Hilary Rosen, President and CEO, Recording 
Industry Association of America) (“The only reason record companies can risk 
investment in the new artists and absorb losses from failures is because, when 
successful artists make it, money goes back into the system.”). 
 106 See Philips, Record Label Chorus, supra note 1 (discussing one failed act 
that received a $750,000 advance, which was allocated to cover the cost of recording its 
first album and to provide the group with about $250,000 to live on after deducting 
legal and management fees.  The company invested an additional $2.8 million to roll 
out a marketing campaign to reach retail stores, radio, music TV networks, and 
another $1.2 million for retail product placement, tour support, photo shoots, 
advertising and radio and TV show appearances to boost the CD.  The album sold only 
100,000 copies and the label dropped the act after losing more than $2.7 million on the 
project.). 
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up for these losses.  The application of section 2855(b) allows 
just that.107     
B. Application of Section 2855(b) 
Problems arise from the dissonance between the 
quantity-based requirements of the standard recording 
contract and the temporal requirements of the Seven Year 
Statute.108  Labels assert that an artist can easily deliver one 
album a year, and therefore can deliver seven albums within 
the statutory time period.109  When an artist is forced to 
promote records via tours, music videos, and television 
appearances, however, this makes the labels’ proposed delivery 
schedule almost impossible to meet.110  All these additional 
activities can extend the time period between albums to two 
years.111  In effect, section 2855(b) permits record labels to 
extend the duration of a recording agreement to fourteen years 
or more; because of this, the labels have no reason not to 
demand seven or more albums.112   
  
 107 Marlowe, supra note 49 (“The nonprofit Future of Music 
Coalition . . . submitted a detailed written analysis of standard recording industry 
contracts.  ‘We are submitting this critique here as a means to shed light on the major-
label working environment, which leaves an estimated 99.6% of artists in debt to their 
record labels.’”). 
 108 California Labor Code Section 2855 and Recording Artists’ Contracts, 
supra note 11, at 2641 (“The combination of contract terms based on the number of 
albums delivered and the amendment of section 2855 to include 2855(b) in effect 
shifted the problems associated with the unanswered questions to the artists.  The 
problems arose from the dissonance between the temporal requirements of section 2855 
and the quantity-based requirements of the standard recording contract, the duration 
of which is defined by an album delivery requirement . . . .”). 
 109 See Holland, Performers Give Testimony, supra note 9 (“Answering 
questions from lawmakers about whether the number of albums contractually 
requested by labels can be delivered in seven years, MCA’s [senior VP of business and 
legal affairs, Mark] Goldstein [sic] gave a list of artists, such as Reba McEntire, who 
can consistently deliver an album every year.”).    
 110 See Chang, supra note 8, at 16-17: 
Since no artist is able to turn out seven albums within seven years, 
considering the restrictions put on them by the labels to take two years 
between record releases to promote the record via tours, music videos, and 
television appearances . . . such quotas allegedly threaten to lock recording 
artists into personal service contracts for at least fourteen years, twice as 
long as the statutorily allotted time period [for other artists under contract]. 
Id. 
 111 See, e.g., Love Cross Complaint, supra note 13, at 6 (“[R]ecord companies 
have preferred and often insisted on a minimum two-year gap between releases for 
artists.”); Cappello & Thielemann, supra note 24, at 17. 
 112 Cappello & Thielemann, supra note 24, at 16 (“When artists sign the 
industry standard contracts, no one expects them to deliver seven albums in seven 
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In addition to effectively allowing record labels to 
demand long-term recording agreements, section 2855(b)(3) 
purports to allow damages if an artist gives notice of 
termination under section 2855(a).113  The damages provision of 
section 2855(b)(3), however, is unclear.114  Although neither the 
statute itself nor any case law defines “damages,” record 
companies argue that the courts should equate damages with 
lost profits.115  Back when labels were granted exclusive control 
over recordings only, the record company could base damages 
solely on sales from these recordings.116  Under the theory of 
lost profits, a record company would have been entitled to 
recover the expected profits on the additional albums that an 
artist had yet to deliver when he breached the contract.117     
In awarding damages on the lost profits theory, the 
court would be required to make a calculation of the future 
worth of a contract.118  Recovery of damages for lost profits 
depends on three questions: whether the defendant’s conduct 
was the proximate cause of the damages; whether the damages 
were foreseeable as a probable result of the breach at the time 
the contract was made; and whether the damages can be 
proven with reasonable certainty.119  Assuming a record 
company will easily be able to meet the proximate cause and 
forseeability prongs, the label will still need to prove that it 
would incur damages with “reasonable certainty.”120  The courts 
  
years, yet the industry uses the threat of speculative lost profits under Section 2855(b) 
to force an artist to produce seven albums even if doing so will require the artist to 
perform beyond seven years.”). 
 113 Section 2855(b)(3) states: 
In the event a party to [a recording contract] is, or could contractually be, 
required to render personal service in the production of a specified quantity of 
the phonorecords and fails to render all of the required service . . . the party 
damaged by the failure shall have the right to recover damages for each 
phonorecord as to which that party has failed to render service in an action. 
CAL. LAB. CODE § 2855 (West 2005). 
 114 See California Labor Code Section 2855 and Recording Artists’ Contracts, 
supra note 11, at 2642; Baumgartner, supra note 18, at 84; Cappello & Thielemann, 
supra note 24, at 17. 
 115 See Cappello & Thielemann, supra note 24, at 17. 
 116 KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 22, at 16.  See infra Part V.B for a 
discussion on the application of subsection (b) in today’s music world where the label 
earns revenue from more than just sales of recordings. 
 117 KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 22, at 16. 
 118 Van Beveren, supra note 39, at 412. 
 119 See 1 ROBERT L. DUNN, RECOVERY OF DAMAGES FOR LOST PROFITS §§ 1.1, 
1.4, 1.8 (4th ed. 1992). 
 120 California Labor Code Section 2855 and Recording Artists’ Contracts, 
supra note 11, at 2644. 
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have held that “if plaintiff’s proof leaves uncertain whether 
plaintiff would have made any profits at all, there can be no 
recovery.”121    
The record company would attempt to prove with 
certainty the future profitability of the artist with evidence of 
number of records sold, profits on past record sales, the 
popularity of the artist, and other indicators of success.122  
While all this data would help the court assess the future 
profits a company expects to earn from record sales, nothing in 
the music business can be predicted with certainty.123  A hit 
record in the past does not guarantee similar sales in the 
future; often, artists are simply one-hit wonders.124  A popular 
group with many successful albums may not be able to create 
another album whose numbers match past sales figures.125  For 
example, unforeseen personality or substance abuse problems 
could surface.126   
  
 121 Id. (quoting 1 ROBERT L. DUNN, RECOVERY OF DAMAGES FOR LOST PROFITS 
§§ 1.1, 1.4, 1.8 (5th ed. 1998)).  See also Kids’ Universe v. In2labs, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
158, 169 (Ct. App. 2002) (“Lost anticipated profits cannot be recovered if it is uncertain 
whether any profit would have been derived at all from the proposed undertaking 
(quoting S.C. Anderson, Inc. v. Bank of America, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 286, 289 (1994) 
(internal quotation marks omitted))). 
 122 Id. at 2647 n.109 (“The record company would put on evidence such as past 
record sales, increasing rates of sales, critics’ record reviews and predictions of 
popularity, plans for future touring and the revenue gained or lost by touring, 
testimony about the quality of marketability of partially completed songs and albums, 
stability and longevity . . . .”). 
 123 Van Beveren, supra note 39, at 412.  As an example of the difficulty 
inherent in calculating lost profits, what if Alanis Morissette decided to leave her 
record label after seven years but still owed the company four more albums?  It is 
unclear whether the company would be allowed to base the value of damages on her 30-
million selling hit, “Jagged Little Pill,” or her follow-up, “Supposed Former Infatuation 
Junkie,” which sold just 2 million copies.  Philips, Lawmakers Take Aim, supra note 73. 
 124 For an in-depth look of all the one-hit wonders from the ‘50s to the ‘90s, 
visit http://www.onehitwondercentral.com.  Some of the most played songs of all time 
were originally performed by artists that were never heard from again: The Penguins, 
“Earth Angel”; The Bobbettes, “Mr. Lee”; The Monotones, “The Book of Love”; Bobby 
Day, “Rockin’ Robin”; Devo, “Whip It”; Sugar Hill Gang, “Rapper’s Delight”; Bow Wow 
Wow, “I Want Candy”; Toni Basil, “Mickey”; Dexy’s Midnight Runners, “Come On 
Eileen”; House of Pain, “Jump Around”; the list goes on and on.  Id. 
 125 Van Beveren, supra note 39, at 412. 
 126 Id.  One-time pop diva, Whitney Houston, whose albums were certified 
seventeen, thirteen and nine times platinum, entered a drug treatment rehabilitation 
center in early 2004 to deal with her years of rumored drug abuse.  See Recording 
Industry Association of America, Gold & Platinum Searchable Database: Whitney 
Houston, http://www.riaa.com/gp/database/ (search “Whitney Houston”) (last visited 
Sept. 22, 2006); César G. Soriano, Whitney Houston Enters Drug Rehabilitation Center, 
USA TODAY, Mar. 16, 2004, at 01D, available at 2004 WLNR 6255933.  The RIAA 
defines a “platinum album” as one million units sold.  Recording Industry Association 
of America, Gold & Platinum, available at http://www.riaa.com/ gp/default.asp (last 
visited Sept. 22, 2006). 
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Even “successful, established artists are subject to the 
same uncertainties that face the average artist.”127  Some of the 
most successful artists of all time have been unable to maintain 
past record sales.  For example, Michael Jackson, the biggest-
selling solo artist of all time, literally shattered sales records.  
Two of his albums, Off the Wall and Dangerous, reached a 
status of seven times platinum, Bad had sales of eight times 
platinum, and Thriller, which holds the title of best-selling 
album in history, was certified twenty-six times platinum.128  
However, in 2002, Jackson’s album Invincible was certified 
only two times platinum,129 a number that fell far short of his 
past sales records.  In addition to the inherent market 
uncertainties, it is completely speculative for record companies 
to assume that over the next twenty years they would actually 
exercise each and every one of the remaining options.130  Given 
the emotiveness of the various factors that can affect future 
lost profits, courts should not get involved with determining 
such an incalculable number.131   
Even if a court was able to devise a fair and workable 
method for the calculation of lost profits, the outcome would 
become even more onerous for the artist.  Because a record 
company’s profit on a single album typically exceeds the 
royalties that the artist earns, the lost profits a record company 
purportedly suffers would exceed whatever royalty the artist 
would earn under a new record deal.132  Artists who breach 
their contracts would be free to sign with a new record label, 
but would never see a dime since they would owe their previous 
record company more money in alleged lost profits than they 
would earn in royalties from their new record contract.133  The 
  
 127 California Labor Code Section 2855 and Recording Artists’ Contracts, 
supra note 11, at 2647. 
 128 Recording Industry Association of America, Gold & Platinum Searchable 
Database: Michael Jackson, http://www.riaa.com/gp/database/ (search “Michael 
Jackson”) (last visited Sept. 22, 2006). 
 129 Id.  As another example of the unpredictability that affects all artists, 
Mariah Carey’s self-titled album Mariah Carey was certified nine times platinum, 
Music Box and Daydream were both certified ten times platinum, while Glitter sold 
only one million albums.  Recording Industry Association of America, Gold & Platinum 
Searchable Database: Mariah Carey, http://www.riaa.com/gp/database/ (search “Mariah 
Carey”) (last visited Sept. 22, 2006).   
 130 See Cappello & Thielemann, supra note 24, at 17. 
 131 Van Beveren, supra note 39, at 413-14 (“It is important to recognize that 
determining the value of an artist’s contract is not synonymous with judging artistic 
merit.  Courts have been extremely unwilling to judge a performer’s quality.”).  
 132 Cappello & Thielemann, supra note 24, at 17. 
 133 Id. 
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artist would also owe financial commitments to her new record 
company, thus the artist’s royalties would be paid to both her 
old record label and her new one.  
Faced with these dismal prospects, few artists choose to 
terminate their contracts under section 2855(a).  Many 
recording artists that attempted to litigate the issue in court134 
alleged that the issue of “damages” imposes involuntary 
servitude, which exists because they have “no available choice 
but to work or be subject to legal sanction.”135  While these 
artists most definitely had a strong argument, at least they 
could still rely on ancillary revenue streams for additional 
income.  At this time, recording agreements only granted the 
labels control over recordings and merchandising; therefore, an 
artist being sued for damages could still bring in revenue from 
commercial endorsements, merchandising, music publishing, 
and acting deals.136  This would quickly change, however, as the 
industry evolved and record companies began to demand more 
control over an artist’s creative works. 
  
 134 Several artists have sued their labels over contract disputes.  See Holland, 
Performers Give Testimony, supra note 9, at 1, 4, 5.  The list of artists that have sued 
their labels include: Prince, the Beatles, the Beach Boys, Sammy Hagar, L.A. Reid, 
Teena Marie, Kenny Rogers, Donna Summers, Barry White, Meat Loaf, the Eagles, 
Metallica, Oscar de la Hoya, Luther Vandross, Toni Braxton, Beck, Bone Thugs-N-
Harmony, the Bellany Brothers, ‘N Sync, Bush, New Edition, the Goo Goo Dolls, TLC, 
Dr. Dre, Blondie, the heirs of Buddy Holly, Blink-182, and various others.  Id.  at 5. 
  Two of the most publicized cases, involving Dixie Chicks and Courtney 
Love, focused national attention on the Seven Year Statute—the artists battled their 
labels over undelivered albums and payments of royalties.  Baumgartner, supra note 
18, at 81.  Both cases challenged the “legality of many provisions of record contracts in 
that most artists have little or no negotiation power, and that the contracts are 
onerous, unconscionable, a restraint of trade, and are even criminal.”  See Holland, 
Performers Give Testimony, supra note 9, at 4.  In both cases, the parties agreed to 
settle before going to trial.  Baumgartner, supra note 18, at 81. A settlement is typical 
for lawsuits between an artist and her record company for several reasons.  One reason 
is that artist attorneys have no desire to change the climate created by unfair contracts 
and unhappy clients.  Another is that companies would rather settle a complaint than 
be involved in lengthy litigation.  See, e.g., Holland, Performers Give Testimony, supra 
note 9; Philips & Morain, Company Town; Measure on Music Contracts Planned; 
Entertainment: State Senator Says He’ll Challenge Statute that Ties Recording Artists 
to Years-Long Contracts, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2001, available at LEXIS News Library, 
USPAPR file. 
 135 See Cappello & Thielemann, supra note 24, at 16 (citing United States v. 
Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 942-43 (1988)). 
 136 Philips, Record Label Chorus, supra note 1. 
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IV. EVOLUTION OF THE MUSIC INDUSTRY AND RECORDING 
AGREEMENTS 
A. 2000: Digital Distribution  
Well, there’s a lot of smart people at the music companies.  The 
problem is, they’re not technology people. . . . And so when the 
Internet came along, and Napster came along, they didn’t know 
what to make of it.  A lot of these folks didn’t use computers—
weren’t on e-mail; didn’t really know what Napster was for a few 
years.  They were pretty doggone slow to react.  Matter of fact, they 
still haven’t really reacted, in many ways.137 
In 1999, an eighteen year-old college dropout, Shawn 
Fanning, developed an idea that drove the music industry 
mad.138  Fanning and “an Internet chat-room friend, founded 
Napster, a peer-to-peer file sharing service that enabled its 
users to trade and share music files for free over the 
Internet.”139  At the same time, major record labels experienced 
an economic downturn.140  The number of units shipped in the 
United States decreased by about ten percent from 2000 to 
2001, which led to a decrease in sales of about $600 million.141  
This was also the first time the recording industry experienced 
a decline in CD sales since 1994—units shipped decreased by 
  
 137 Adaptation based on Jeff Goodell, Steve Jobs: The Rolling Stone Interview, 
ROLLING STONE, Dec. 3, 2003, http://www.rollingstone.com/news/story/_/id/5939600. 
 138 Joseph A. Sifferd, The Peer-to-Peer Revolution: A Post-Napster Analysis of 
the Rapidly Developing File-Sharing Technology, 4 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 93 (2002).  
 139 Id. at 93.  Even though the Ninth Circuit determined that Napster violated 
existing copyright law and Napster consequently shut down, various other file-sharing 
websites emerged, such as Morpheus, Grokster and Kazaa.  See Schorr, supra note 6, 
at 77-78.  On June 27, 2005, the Supreme Court unanimously ruled that file-sharing 
companies, such as Grokster and Morpheus, can be held liable when promoting theft of 
copyrighted materials.  While this decision was a “win” for the record labels, analysts 
predict the ruling will have little impact on the availability of illegally downloaded 
music and movies.  See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 545 U.S. 
913 (2005); Sarah Rodman, And the Beat Goes On . . . Analysts See Little Impact of 
Court’s Downloading Ruling, BOSTON HERALD, June 28, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 
10175860. 
 140 Schorr, supra note 6, at 68.  (“Major record labels [were] floundering for 
their economic survival.”).  See also id. at 72-73 (“The major labels are experiencing an 
economic downturn.  The number of recordings shipped in the United States from 
record companies to retail outlets . . . fell 10.3% in 2001, and more than 15% over the 
last two years. . . . Globally, the value of the international music market plunged 5%, 
and unit sales dropped by 6.5% in 2001.  Industry insiders estimate that between 5,000 
and 10,000 music industry employees have been laid off, and many established 
recording artists have been discharged by their labels.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 141 Recording Industry Association of America, Recording Industry Association 
of America’s 2004 Yearend Statistics, http://www.riaa.com/news/newsletter/ 
pdf/2004yearEndStats.pdf (last visited Sept. 22, 2006).   
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seven percent and dollar sales decreased by two percent.142  
Record label executives blamed the poor record sales on 
increased online piracy through file-sharing websites.143  They 
fought vigorously to conquer the Internet by suing the online 
competition for appropriation of their copyrighted music and by 
creating their own subscription services.144  
As the industry began to change drastically, standard 
provisions in recording agreements changed as well, but not as 
one might suspect.  Ten years prior, after the CD was 
introduced, “any record company with a library suddenly 
became a ‘cash cow.’”145  Labels were in the mode of “spend big 
to sell big,” and recording agreements began to reflect this 
growing wealth.146  A new artist typically received an advance 
of $175,000 to $300,000, whereas a mid-level recording artist 
may have received an advance of up to $600,000, twice of what 
an artist in the late eighties would receive.147  The advance for a 
top-selling artist could rise to more than $1,500,000, over $1 
million more than thirteen years prior.148  Labels insisted on a 
total of five to seven albums over the course of a deal, instead 
of the eight to ten options they used to require twenty years 
before.149  A new artist that entered into a recording agreement 
in 2000 typically received a royalty of anywhere between 
  
 142 Id. 
 143 Schorr, supra note 6, at 73.  “The music industry had never experienced a 
decline of this magnitude.”  Steal This Song; Go Ahead and Burn That MP3. The Music 
Biz Will Thank You Later, SCENE ENT. WKLY., Nov. 19, 2003, available at 2003 WLNR 
13301184 [hereinafter Steal This Song]. 
 144 Schorr, supra note 6, at 75-76. 
 145 Phil Gallo & Meredith Amdur, Time to Face the Music: Mergers, New 
Owners, Piracy Reshaping Tune Biz, DAILY VARIETY, Dec. 9, 2003, available at 2003 
WLNR 10942868.   
 146 Id. (“With an eye cast more toward marketshare to impress shareholders 
than toward artist development to attract musicians, the industry moved to a model in 
which only bigger was better.  That paved the way for free-spending on hype and 
marketing that focused on only the most commercial of recordings.”).  Record labels say 
they are still suffering from a spate of expensive deals negotiated during the middle 
and late 1990s.  Philips, Record Label Chorus, supra note 1. 
 147 PASSMAN, 5th ed., supra note 12, at 93.  See also supra note 89 and 
accompanying text.  In the fifth edition of his book, Donald Passman distinguishes 
artists as follows: New Artist: an artist that has never signed a record deal, or an artist 
that has been signed but never sold over 250,000 albums per release; Midlevel Artist: 
an artist whose last album sold in the 750,000 to 1,500,000 range; Superstar: sales 
from 2,500,000 and up.  PASSMAN, 5th ed., supra note 12, at 87.  These sales criteria 
are much larger than those in the eighties, and reflect the success that the industry 
experienced during the nineties with the advent of the CD.  See supra note 89. 
 148 PASSMAN, 5th ed., supra note 12, at 93.  See also supra note 90 and 
accompanying text. 
 149 PASSMAN, 5th ed., supra note 12, at 93.  See also supra notes 86-87 and 
accompanying text. 
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thirteen to sixteen percent of the suggested retail list price, a 
definite improvement from the eleven to thirteen percent he 
used to receive years ago.150 
While the terms of the newer agreements may have 
appeared more favorable to the artist, labels actually added to 
the oppression of artists by introducing new provisions to make 
up for the losses they were experiencing after the introduction 
of digital downloads.  One such provision was the packaging 
royalty deduction, which provided for deductions of up to 
twenty-five percent off the artist’s royalty to pay for label 
development of digital electronic transmissions, future digital 
downloads, upkeep of Websites, and expanding label Internet 
presence.151  In addition, the labels were able to maintain new 
technology royalty deductions of up to twenty-five percent.  In 
the eighties, labels justified these deductions for the 
development of CDs.152  After the introduction of online 
distribution, labels defended the deductions to make up for the 
costs involved in such new configurations as digital compact 
cassette, DVD-Audio, and audiophile records.153  In effect, these 
provisions procured the artist’s money for the label.154 
  
 150 PASSMAN, 5th ed., supra note 12, at 93.  See also supra note 94 and 
accompanying text. 
 151 Holland, Performers Give Testimony, supra note 9. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id.  Essentially, “the modernization of product formats and manufacturing 
processes [was] at least partly charged against artists’ recoupment accounts.”  Id.  
 154 For example, if a new artist received a royalty of fourteen percent, an 
eighty-five percent rate on CDs (new technology deduction), a three percent producer, 
recording costs of $300,000, and tour support of $50,000, his or her royalty for sales of 
500,000 albums looked something like this: 
 
Suggested Retail Price $18.98 
Less: Packaging (25%) -4.74 
Royalty Base $14.24 
Royalty Rate (14%, less 3% for the producer [11%] x 
85% for CD [9.35%]) 
 
x 9.35% 
Royalty $1.33 
Royalty x 500,000 units x 500,000 
 $665,000 
Less 15% “free goods factor” -99,750 
 $565,250 
Less: Recording Costs -300,000 
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With the label receiving a greater share of revenues by 
reducing the artist’s royalty, the record companies’ arguments 
in defense of section 2855(b) became even less valid.155  In 1987, 
recording industry lobbyists told lawmakers that labels did not 
earn a profit on their successful artists until the fourth album, 
and therefore they would be severely injured if the artist did 
not deliver the remaining three albums.156  This argument may 
have had some validity twenty years ago, when the recording 
industry was based on development.157  Back then, labels 
nurtured their artists and focused on developing long-term 
successes.158  According to then-deputy president of EMI 
Recorded Music, Roy Lott, it was not until artists Kenny G. and 
Sarah McLachlan were on their fourth albums and into the 
fifth year of their contracts that they started to experience 
success.159  
By the beginning of the century, however, labels had 
shifted their focus to creating immediate superstars.  If an 
artist’s record did not immediately succeed, the record company 
did not exercise its option and it dropped the artist.160  Labels 
could no longer claim that the reason they needed to be 
exempted from the Seven Year Statute was because they 
needed to “develop” the artist.   Nonetheless, the record 
companies continued to operate under the protection of 
subsection (b).  As a result, an artist being sued for breach of 
contract would be liable to the label for an even larger amount 
of damages since lost profits would include these monies that 
rightfully belonged to the artist but that the label now claimed.  
  
Less: 50% of independent promotion -100,000 
Less: 50% of video costs -75,000 
Less: tour support -50,000 
TOTAL $40,250 
Calculations adapted from PASSMAN, 5th ed., supra note 12, at 98. 
 155 See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text. 
 156 See Philips, Lawmakers Take Aim, supra note 73. 
 157 Hearings: 2001, supra note 70 (statement of Michael Greene, President & 
CEO, Grammy’s, discussing the differences in relationships between artists and labels 
in the 1980’s and today, and drawing attention to the fact that artists used to be 
developed and nurtured by the labels whereas today using the word “relationship” may 
be completely inappropriate, given the lack of its existence). 
 158 Id. 
 159 See Newman, supra note 9. 
 160 Hearings: 2001, supra note 70 (testimony of Ann Chaitovitz, Director of 
Sound Recordings, AFTRA). 
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As labels soon realized that digital distribution was here to 
stay, they quickly found novel ways to secure for themselves a 
larger share of the artist’s profits. 
B. 2005: Expanding the Rights of Labels in the Music 
Industry 
Shawn Fanning turned twenty-five in late November of this year, 
and it’s been a very long seven years since he wrote a little computer 
program that let him trade electronic music files with his dorm 
mates.  He called it Napster, and it quickly grew into an Internet 
phenomenon, not to mention the music industry’s bête noire until 
the courts shut it down four years ago.   
Now the spotlight is turning back to Mr. Fanning, this time as a 
symbol of how big business and the disruptive force of the Internet 
just might find a way to get along.  By year-end, Grokster, a new file 
sharing service will appear—this one sanctioned by the record 
industry because it will use technology that requires file-swappers to 
pay for copyrighted material.161 
In the few years since the introduction of digital 
distribution, the music companies have finally caught on.  They 
are starting to embrace the idea that peer-to-peer file-sharing 
services can be reconstituted as legal sales outlets.162  Album 
sales, however, are still not what they used to be.  Sales are 
thirty percent below their level the year Napster was let loose, 
and ten times as many songs are illegally downloaded from file 
sharing services as are bought from paid services like Apple’s 
iTunes.163 
Nonetheless, labels have started to accept the new 
business models presented by innovative media such as 
downloads, subscriptions, and ringtones.164  As the Web quickly 
replaces traditional forms of music distribution, label 
executives and artist managers are frequently at odds over how 
to slice up these new “money pies.”165  Labels are fighting to 
  
 161 Adaptation based on Saul Hansell, Putting the Napster Genie Back in the 
Bottle, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 18734374. 
 162 Id. (“Apple Computer and other companies have built thriving, 
unquestionably legal music-downloading businesses.”). 
 163 Id. 
 164 Antony Bruno, Video Booms Online—But for Whom? Explosive Demand for 
Clips Sparks Renewed Debate on how Artists Should Share the Wealth, BILLBOARD, 
Oct. 29, 2005, available at LEXIS News Library, USPAPR file [hereinafter Bruno, 
Video Booms Online]. 
 165 Id.  Ringtones are a good example.  Bernie Lawrence-Watkins, Esq. 
describes a ringtone as:  
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obtain the largest possible portion of the revenues attributed to 
digital downloads, video downloads, ringtones, and ringbacks.166  
In addition to these novel revenue streams, labels are 
exploiting and expanding their traditional areas of exclusivity 
to include areas that used to belong to the artists: videogames, 
film, and TV.167  Labels are trying to muscle their way into all 
these additional revenue streams by adding non-negotiable 
provisions to the standard recording agreements that require 
artists to share these ancillary revenues with the label.168  
Record companies are even requiring currently signed artists to 
accept amendments to their existing agreements that grant the 
label the exclusive rights to these new media.169  Fred Davis, a 
prominent music entertainment attorney, points out that: 
  
a portion of a song embodied in a digital file and rendered into audio. 
Ringtones allow you to customize the sound your mobile phone makes when 
you receive a call.  Ringtone providers license the sound 
recordings/compositions from music labels and publishers, reformat the 
song—usually in 30 second formats—for mobile phone use and stores the 
format on their database. 
Dennis M., 7 Questions with Bernie Lawrence-Watkins, Esq.; A Backstage Pass to the 
Music Industry, ATLANTA TRIB., July 1, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 14596030. 
  When ringtones first arrived on the cell phone market, artists and their 
mangers ignored them, doubting any real revenue could come from cell phone rings. 
Bruno, Video Booms Online, supra note 164.  Now that the industry is worth $3 billion 
globally, some artists feel that ringtones should yield a licensing rate of 50%, instead of 
what most get: a royalty rate, generally 10-20%.  See Bruno, Video Booms Online, 
supra note 164; Lawrence-Watkins, supra note 165.  Analysts predict that this is a 
market that will continue to grow.  As full-track ringtone downloads stabilize around a 
$1.50 price point, the lucrative realtone (ringtones that sound more like online digital 
music downloads because of the vocals and the improved voice quality) market 
currently charges around $3 to $3.50.  The Specialist Role of the Aggregators, MUSIC 
WK., Sept. 4, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 14921366.  See also Bruno, Video Booms 
Online, supra note 164. 
 166 Artists typically receive a thirteen percent royalty on record sales before 
any royalty deductions, which then leaves the artist with a royalty of around nine 
percent.  See supra Part III.A.  With digital downloads, artists receive an even smaller 
eleven percent royalty, based on the standard 99 cent price before any deductions.  
Bruno, Video Booms Online, supra note 164.   
  In addition to digital downloads, labels are claiming a stake in online video 
download receipts.  In mid-October of this year, Apple announced that it would expand 
its à la carte model to sell music videos.  Id.  Some labels have started charging for 
access to their video libraries on America Online and Yahoo.  Id.  Theses sites have 
shown explosive growth in video demand online—Yahoo streamed 3 billion music 
videos in 2004, and now averages about 350 million music videos per month. Id.  
Labels now charge about $1.40 per video, and pay the artists a royalty percentage.  Id.  
Artists and their lawyers contend that the video sales should be counted as a license 
instead of a royalty, which would increase the artist share to fifty percent of the fee.  
Id. 
 167 Sloane, supra note 30. 
 168 Id. 
 169 Personal experience/interviews subject to confidentiality.   
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Right now the issue of distribution of digital income isn’t on the 
radar of most artists.  However, when you combine the projected 
income in 2006 from ringtones, digital downloads, subscriptions and 
video income, it’s going to become an ever-increasing portion of artist 
revenue.  The battle lines need to be formed right now.170 
Record companies defend these new exclusive rights by 
arguing that they are not trying to control an artist’s ability to 
exploit her music in other formats, they only want to share in 
the income derived from an artist’s activities in other media.171  
Agreements used to require only that artists promise not to 
make records for anyone else.172  Activities in other media—TV, 
webcasting, or film—were untouched, and the artist was able 
to profit from those activities, owing nothing to the record 
company as long as the recordings were not part of a motion 
picture soundtrack.173  Under the new deal terms, however, a 
recording artist may not, without record company approval, 
and presumably, financial involvement, appear in a TV show, 
webcast, or motion picture unless the role is completely 
unrelated to the artist’s endeavors as a musician.174  These new 
agreements only add to the unconscionability of the artists’ 
situation because artists have lost control over the ability to 
convert their musical fame into other financial opportunities.175  
As one example of today’s revised agreements, EMI 
recently signed an agreement with the rap-metal band Korn, 
which gives EMI a stake in almost every dollar the band will 
earn worldwide over at least the next five years.176  EMI will 
pay the four-member band an estimated $15 million upfront—
more than twice what the band might expect from a traditional 
recording contract.  In return, EMI will get more than twenty-
five percent of the band’s publishing, merchandising, and 
touring revenue, as well as profits from the group’s albums.177  
Artist managers and attorneys are concerned about these deals 
that appear to favor the artists, because in reality, they deprive 
the artists of a substantial part of their income.178  They 
  
 170 Bruno, Video Booms Online, supra note 164. 
 171 Sloane, supra note 30. 
 172 Id.  See also notes 101-02 and accompanying text. 
 173 Sloane, supra note 30. 
 174 Id. 
 175 Id. (“[R]ecord companies are trying to secure a bigger piece of the artist’s 
pie without paying or adding anything extra.”). 
 176 Duhigg, supra note 33. 
 177 Id. 
 178 Id. 
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maintain that musicians rely on concerts and licensing 
contracts for as much as seventy percent of their income.179  It 
used to be that recording artists could “earn millions of dollars 
from concerts, commercial endorsements, merchandising, 
music publishing and acting deals, none of which they share[d] 
with their labels.”180  These new agreements render the 
application of section 2855(b) even more disastrous for the 
artist than ever before. 
V. ARGUMENT TO REPEAL SECTION 2855(b) 
A.  Application of Section 2855(b) to the Music Industry 
Today 
As labels transform themselves from vendors of physical 
goods to licensors of digital media, label executives, artist 
managers, and attorneys will continue to fight over how to slice 
up ancillary revenues.181  Given their command of the entire 
recorded music industry, it is hardly surprising that the record 
labels are quickly gaining control over new revenue streams as 
well as traditional revenue channels that once belonged solely 
to the artist.182  Even if the record companies were to 
compensate the artists fairly, the issue remains that in the 
past artists typically relied on these activities as financial 
opportunities that were untouched by the label.183  
Under this new contract model, the artists have even 
more reason for dissension as the legal effects of applying 
section 2855(b) are revealed.184  Under the lost profits theory, it 
used to be that a record company would be entitled to recover 
the expected profits on the additional albums that the artist 
had not yet delivered.185  Although subsection (b) provides for 
damages for phonorecords,186 which at the passing of the 
amendment only existed in the form of vinyl, cassettes, and 
  
 179 Id. 
 180 Philips, Record Label Chorus, supra note 1. 
 181 Antony Bruno, The Future of Music: Industry Transformation is Just 
Getting Started, BILLBOARD, at 33, Dec. 3, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 19575250 
[hereinafter Bruno, The Future of Music]. 
 182 See supra Part IV.B. 
 183 See supra notes 136, 178-80 and accompanying text. 
 184 See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 185 Id. 
 186 See CAL. LAB. CODE § 2855 (West 2005). 
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CDs,187 U.S. copyright law defines phonorecords as sounds fixed 
in any method that existed in 1976 or that were later 
developed.188  Therefore, under today’s recording agreements, a 
label recovering for breach of contract will also claim the new, 
additional, and rapidly growing revenue streams that fit within 
the definition of phonorecords as damages.  
This problem is aggravated by the nature of today’s 
industry.  With the push for one-hit wonders and instant 
successes, labels may be bringing in more revenue on a new 
artist within the first few months of an album release due to 
ringtones, ringbacks, and video download sales than they used 
to make on a successful artist after two or three albums.189  
Because the labels contend that an artist’s future worth is 
based on past profits,190 after just one semi-successful album 
and additional sales through supplemental revenue streams, a 
label may be able to claim millions of dollars in damages. 
While the application of section 2855(b) was plainly 
unfair when it was passed, at least an artist being sued for 
breach of contract back then could rely on other financial 
opportunities such as film, TV, and licensing.191  Today, 
however, an artist is not only liable for a practically unlimited 
amount of potential lost profits, but she has also lost the 
opportunity to exploit and expand on her creative works.  
Therefore the artist is left penniless.  Faced with such bleak 
prospects, an artist is left in a situation whereby she is subject 
  
 187 See Recording Industry Association of America, Recording Industry 
Association of America’s 1999 Yearend Statistics, http://www.riaa.com/news/ 
newsletter/pdf/2004yearEndStats.pdf (last visited Sept. 22, 2006).  The yearend 
statistics from 1990 only include sales figures for CDs, cassettes, and vinyl records.  It 
was not until 2004 that the RIAA included sales figures for digital formats.  See 
Recording Industry Association of America, Recording Industry Association of 
America’s 2004 Yearend Statistics, http://www.riaa.com/news/newsletter/pdf/ 
2004yearEndStats.pdf (last visited Sept. 22, 2006). 
 188 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).  U.S. Copyright law defines “phonorecords” as 
“material objects in which sounds, other than those accompanying a motion picture or 
other audiovisual work, are fixed by any method now known or later developed, and 
from which the sounds can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, 
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”  Id. 
 189 Record Biz Taking Hits on All Sides, VARIETY, June 27, 2005, available at 
2005 WLNR 11655954.  PricewaterhouseCoopers predicts that consumer music 
spending will rise 8.3% between 2004 and 2009, and “at least 6% of that increase will 
be created by purchases of digital downloads and mobile music.”  Id.  See also supra 
note 170 and accompanying text (quotation of Fred Davis, projecting the ever-
increasing amount of income that ringtones, digital downloads, subscriptions and 
videos will bring in). 
 190 See supra Part II.C. 
 191 See supra notes 136 and 175 and accompanying text. 
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to unconscionable agreements that impose involuntary 
servitude.   
B. Unconscionability and Involuntary Servitude in Music 
Contracts Today: An Analysis 
The California legislature originally enacted the Seven 
Year Statute to protect against involuntary servitude in the 
form of unconscionable agreements.192  Within the last twenty 
years, courts have been more willing to apply the doctrine of 
unconscionability to protect contracting parties in the 
entertainment industry from harsh and oppressive terms in 
contracts.193  The doctrine has yet to be applied to the duration 
of a recording agreement.194  In determining whether a contract 
is unconscionable, courts will look for the presence of 
procedural unconscionability, which exists when one party 
lacks meaningful choice in entering a contract or negotiating 
its terms, and substantive unconscionability, which exists 
when the terms are unreasonably favorable to the other 
party.195  Some courts require a showing that the contract was 
both procedurally and substantively unconscionable when 
made.196  However, some courts have held that “substantive 
unconscionability may be sufficient in itself even though 
procedural unconscionability is not.”197  Other courts have 
indicated that a sliding scale applies.198  
In determining whether a contract is unconscionable, 
and thus unenforceable under law, California courts apply a 
sliding scale test. 199  The more substantively oppressive a 
contract term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability 
is required to come to the conclusion that the term is 
  
 192 See supra Part II.A. 
 193 Anorga, supra note 8, at 747 (“An increasing amount of cases involving the 
entertainment industry have been litigated within the last twenty years, and courts 
have appeared more willing to apply the doctrine of unconscionability to protect 
contracting parties from harsh and oppressive terms in contracts.”). 
 194 See id. at 759-63 (discussing whether the lengths of standardized music 
contracts would be considered unconscionable by a court in California). 
 195 See Harry G. Prince, Unconscionability in California: A Need for Restraint 
and Consistency, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 459, 472 (1995) (“Most successful 
[unconscionability] claims involve a combination of procedural and substantive 
unconscionability, but it is debatable whether both elements must be present.”). 
 196 8 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 42, § 18:10. 
 197 Id. 
 198 Prince, supra note 195, at 472. 
 199 Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1128, 1148 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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unenforceable, and vice versa.200  Even though record 
companies have traditionally taken advantage of artists’ 
ignorance, inexperience, lack of involvement, and lower social 
status,201 a musician signing a contract with a major record 
label is probably represented by a competent individual (e.g., 
manager, agent, or attorney).202  Therefore, a court is unlikely 
to find much evidence of procedural unconscionability in a 
recording agreement.   
On the other hand, a court may hold that same 
agreement to be full of provisions that fit the definition of 
substantive unconscionability.203  The various contract clauses 
that deal with duration, ownership of recordings, recoupment 
of advances, and artist royalties are inherently unfair,204 
especially in light of the free agency status that other creative 
artists enjoy under the Seven Year Statute.205  Instead of 
protecting recording artists from unconscionable agreements in 
the same way it does for film actors and athletes, the Seven 
Year Statute only further exposes musicians by allowing labels 
to keep an artist under contract for well beyond the statutory 
limit, a most unfavorable result for the artist.206  Country singer 
LeAnn Rimes, for example, signed a recording deal when she 
was twelve years old, agreeing to deliver twenty-one records in 
seven years.207  Rimes has pointed out that she will probably be 
working under the contract until she turns thirty-five because 
the standard schedule of recording, touring, and promotion, 
makes it practically impossible for an artist to deliver an album 
a year.208  As a result, she can never leave her label.   
As the court in De Haviland pointed out, there are 
“innumerable reasons” why signing with a new label after a 
reasonable period of time may be to a recording artist’s 
  
 200 Id. at 1148. 
 201 Van Beveren, supra note 39, at 381-82 (quoting Gee v. CBS, Inc., 471 F. 
Supp. 600 (E.D. Pa. 1979)). 
 202 Anorga, supra note 8, at 756. 
 203 Id.  
 204 See supra Part III.A.; Anorga, supra note 8, at 772. 
 205 See Anorga, supra note 8 (discussing why musicians think their contracts 
are unconscionable); Love Cross Complaint, supra note 13, at 2; Marlowe, supra note 
49 (“This statute is unconstitutional because it singles out the record industry.  These 
contracts are unconscionable, signed by entry-level artists who mostly have no power.” 
(quoting music attorney Don Engel)); Courtney Love Sues, supra note 103 (referring to 
Courtney Love’s cross complaint). 
 206 Cappello & Thielemann, supra note 24, at 19. 
 207 Sharp, supra note 6. 
 208 Id. 
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advantage.209  The court stated, “[a]s one grows more 
experienced and skillful, there should be a reasonable 
opportunity to move upward and to employ his abilities to the 
best advantage and for the highest obtainable compensation.”210  
Every artist engaged in rendering personal services enjoys the 
equitable compensation and creative freedom provided by the 
Seven Year Statute, except for contemporary music artists.211 
There is little difference between recording agreements, 
such as LeAnn Rimes’, and the contracts the California 
legislature was trying to prohibit when it passed the Seven 
Year Statute.  The threat of damages an artist faces under 
subsection (b), however, creates exactly the opposite result.  It 
essentially forces recording artists into involuntary servitude.212  
By seeking excessive damages in a suit against an artist, the 
recording company is able to use the threat of enormous, lost 
profit damages to force an artist to produce the remaining 
albums even if doing so will require the artist to perform 
beyond seven years.213  Knowing that she will be liable for 
millions of dollars, the artist will have no choice but to work. 
Any artist who attempts to avoid involuntary servitude 
by breaching her recording agreement is faced with a lack of 
alternate revenue streams upon which artists before her could 
rely.214  This makes involuntary servitude inescapable because 
the artist—now liable for profits from ringtones, ringbacks, and 
video downloads in addition to record sales, and no longer in 
control of these supplementary revenues—will have even less 
of a choice but to work or be subject to legal sanction because of 
the potential for exaggerated damages.  As recording artist Don 
Henley said even before the new agreements, “We aren’t free to 
compete in the marketplace.  We’re talking 
about . . . indentured servitude.”215  Only by repealing the 
amendment can the legislature preclude a result that forces the 
artist into involuntary servitude. 
  
 209 De Haviland v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 153 P.2d 983, 988 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1944). 
 210 Id.  
 211 Cappello & Thielemann, supra note 24, at 16. 
 212 Baumgartner, supra note 18, at 79-80. 
 213 Cappello & Thielemann, supra note 24, at 16. 
 214 Id.  
 215 Marlowe, supra note 49. 
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C. Repealing Section 2855(b) 
Section 2855(b) permits record labels to take part in 
practices that conflict with the doctrines of unconscionability 
and involuntary servitude.  By allowing the labels to sue for 
breach of long-term recording agreements, section 2855(b) 
assists in the creation of unconscionable duration periods and 
helps force the artist into involuntary servitude with the threat 
of damages.  Record companies with vast resources may 
continue to press for settlement in important cases they fear 
they may lose to keep these issues safe from judicial review.  
For these reasons, the California legislature should repeal 
subsection 2855(b).  
Of course, an artist should not be able to just walk away 
from a contractual agreement—it would be disastrous for a 
company to lose the millions it invested in a new artist.216  This 
is not what artists are asking for; they are simply asking that 
they be treated like every other creative artist that is subject to 
the Seven Year Statute.  Recording artists and their supporters 
argue that the television and film industries are similar to the 
recording industry in that they all require large financial 
investment in projects.217  Contrary to the film industry, 
however, the record industry then holds a recording artist, 
unlike any other creative artist, liable for future profits that 
may cover the span of fourteen or more years,218 twice the limit 
imposed by the statute.219   
  
 216 Cook, supra note 37, at 43.  One spokesperson for the RIAA argued that: 
Artists can’t just get a pass on this issue.  There is not going to be sympathy 
for them when they take multimillion-dollar advances from the companies 
and then just walk away before they fulfill the obligations in their contracts.  
Somebody has got to come up with the money to cover damages that the 
companies incur. 
Philips, Lawmakers Take Aim, supra note 73.  Some label executives go so far as to 
suggest that a change in the law would “jeopardize the record company’s ability to earn 
profits from its agreements and run a viable business with successful California-based 
artists.”  Holland, Performers Give Testimony, supra note 9.  History has proven to the 
contrary.  After the holding in De Haviland v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 153 P.2d 983 
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1944), and the demise of the studio system in the film industry, the 
industry actually got bigger.  The “economic freedom for creative people is just good 
business.”  Courtney Love Sues, supra note 103 (quoting A. Barry Cappello).   
 217 Hearings: 2001, supra note 70 (“[T]here is nothing unique about the pre-
production costs associated with the phonorecord industry.  Artists working in other 
fields, such as film . . . also often require substantial advances, investment and 
promotion of the artist over the course of several years and several projects . . .”) 
(testimony of Anne Chaitovitz, Director of Sound Recordings, AFTRA). 
 218 Holland, Performers Give Testimony, supra note 9.  Anne Chaitowitz, 
pointed out that the “film industry’s companies have lived with the seven-year law with 
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If the California legislature repeals subsection (b), 
recording artists would be able to enjoy the same rights as all 
other creative artists.220  There would be a reasonable 
opportunity for them to receive fair-market compensation for 
their services,221 which is one of the major policy reasons behind 
the Seven Year Statute.222  This same law which has created 
oppression over recording artists has created immense 
opportunities for other creative artists, including film actors 
and athletes.223  Free agency has resulted in enormous wealth 
for these individuals, and the film and sports industries have 
prospered even as employee salaries have risen in accordance 
with true market value.224  More than ever before, recording 
artists, who have lost control to convert their creative works 
into other financial opportunities and who are subject to 
unconscionable recording agreements, need the protections of 
section 2855(a).  Repealing the amendment is the only way to 
uphold the original purpose behind the Seven Year Statute.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
The laws here are still evolving (and will be for years), as they try 
mightily to adapt themselves to new technologies that arrive hourly.  
And any time you have a concept created in 1909 being applied to 
things that weren’t even conceived at the time, you create a healthy 
fund to put lawyers’ children through college.   
So, where’s the good news?  Well, we’re learning there’s still a very 
strong desire for music.  We just haven’t figured out how to harness 
it for the forces of good instead of evil.225 
  
no such amendment for nearly two decades [and], ‘They haven’t gone anywhere, have 
they?’”  Id. (her response to suggestions that if the law changed, record companies 
might not only sign fewer artists in California, but might also move to another state). 
 219 Both artists and their attorneys point out the differences in the treatment 
of recording artists and that of all other creative artists.  Don Henley asked, “How can 
everybody else be protected but us?”  Philips, Lawmakers Take Aim, supra note 73.  A. 
Barry Cappello, Courtney Love’s attorney, argued that, “We’re really just trying to 
follow the trend of the law and create the same kind of business opportunities for the 
musicians and record companies that the end of the studio system created for the film 
business and that free agency created in baseball.”  See Courtney Love Sues, supra note 
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The California legislature enacted the Seven Year 
Statute to protect against unconscionable agreements that 
impose involuntary servitude.  The record industry’s efforts to 
avoid a law under which an artist could walk away from an 
agreement after seven years led to the creation of subsection 
(b).  By allowing the record label to sue an artist for breach of 
an agreement, the amendment effectively permits record 
companies to operate in ways that are contrary to the purpose 
of the Seven Year Statute. 
Faced with the threat of millions of dollars of lost profits 
damages, back then, an artist essentially had no choice but to 
work or be subject to legal sanction.  At least an artist that 
breached a recording agreement twenty years ago could rely on 
other financial opportunities, such as TV, film, and licensing, 
for a substantial portion of income.  This is no longer true in 
today’s music world where record labels demand to share in 
these ancillary sources of revenue.  The new agreements, which 
grant the label exclusivity over new and traditional methods of 
distribution, provide an even stronger reason why recording 
artists should be protected by section 2855(a). 
Nonetheless, record labels still enjoy the protections of 
subsection (b).  As a result, artists who wish to leave their 
record labels to seek better terms will be liable for a greater 
amount of damages and will not be able to rely on ancillary 
revenue streams as alternative sources of income.  In effect, 
unconscionability and involuntary servitude are more 
prevalent than ever before. 
For these reasons, the California legislature should 
repeal section 2855(b).  Only then will recording artists be able 
to enjoy the same rights that all other creative artists enjoy 
under the protection of the statute.  Only then will the Seven 
Year Statute be able to return to its original purpose of 
protecting one’s natural liberty. 
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